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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOANN L. BAILEY, a widow, and
TODD F. BAILEY, minor son of
FRANK DEE BAILEY, deceased,
vs.

Case No.

10148

UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION and UTAH STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants

DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF
Utah State Industrial Commission and Utah
State Insurance Fund, the Defendants in the above

entitled matter, by and through their attorney of
record herein, pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules
of CiYil Procedure, respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above entitled
cause upon the following grounds:
1. The decision negates the long established
rule of this Court that one coming and going from
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work is not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah.
2. The decision constitutes "judicial legislation" and, in effect, extends the coverage afforded
self-employed persons far beyond the coverage afforded to the employed workmen.
3. The decision is erroneous in that it failed
to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission
which was supported by competent testimony that
the accident which resulted in the death of Frank
Dee Bailey did not occur in the course of his employment.
WHEREFORE, Defendants request that a
rehearing be granted, that the Court re-examine
the facts and the law and that the decision of the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah be
affirmed.
Dated this lOth day of March, A.D., 1965.
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorney for Defendants,
State Insurance Fund
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I hereby certify that I am the counsel for the
Defendant, Utah State Insurance Fund, Petitioner
herein, and that in my opinion there is good cause
to believe the decision objected to is erroneous and
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that the case ought to be re-examined as prayed in
the Petition, and that this Petition is not filed for
the purpose of delay or to otherwise hinder the
prosecution of this action.
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorney for Defendant,
State Insurance Fund
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utab
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
POINT I.
THE DECISION NEGATES THE LONG ESTABLISHED RULE OF THIS COURT THAT
ONE COMING AND GOING FROM WORK IS
NOT COVERED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The opinion of the Court rendered in this case
said:
"This Court has ruled on numerous occasions that accidents occurring to the employee while going to and from work, in the
absence of a special mission, are not compensable because they did not occur or arise
out of the course of employment."
In support of this statement the Court cited
the following cases with which we agree, and which
we feel clearly, are controlling in this case, and establish the rule that one going to or from work is
not covered under the Workmen's Compensation
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Act of the State of Utah: Covey-Ballard Motor Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 64 U. I, 227 P. 1028;
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 U. 46, 207 P.
2d. 1116; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 189, 8 P. 2d. 617.
The decision of this Court goes on to say that
there are exceptions to the foregoing stated general
rule and cites the case of Vitagraph Company v.
Industrial Commission, 96 U. 190, 85 P. 2d. 601 in
support of this proposition. However, we would like
to point out that in the Vitagraph decision the Court
stated the following:
"It seems definitely settled that if a workman is injured in the normal course of things,
in going to or from his work, or place of
employment, that is the result of general
hazards which all n1ust meet and assume and
is not in the course of his employment."
After citing cases the Court went on to say:
"Such is what may be called the plant
rule, where the employee does not attach
himself to his employment until he arrives
at the plant or locus of his work and he is
not in the employment after he leaves the
plant or situs of his work."
We concede that the law of this state is
that if an employee is injured while actually
on a special mission for his employer, and which
required him to deviate somewhat from the course
of his travels while on his way to work that the
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employee would be covered under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the State of Utah. We submit,
however, that the burden of proof in this case
rested with the Applicant to show that the deceased,
after he left his home was actually engaged in or
was on his way to engage in some work connected
with the operation of the service station other than
merely traveling to his place of work. The evidence
presented to the Industrial Commission was clear
that all Mr. Bailey was doing at the time the accident happened was traveling direct from his home
to his place of employment.
On direct examination Mrs. Bailey, the widow,
was asked by her counsel,
"Q. Now can you tell the Commission
what Mr. Bailey's general habits were in
opening the station in the mornings?
A. Well, he opened. He always did the
opening of the station. He left the house
between 5 :00 and 5 :30 usually, and went
directly to the station.
Q. Calling your attention to the 23rd
of September, 1963, do you know, Mrs. Bailey,
what Mr. Bailey was doing at the time he
was proceeding towards Lehi and met his
death?
A. He was going to open the station.
Q. Now was he in his uniform, that he
wore in the station, at the time of his death?
A. Yes.
Q. What type of uniform is that?
A. It's a standard American Oil uniform.
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Q. And it is a blue type uniform?
A. The blue and white-stripe pants, with
a white shirt, and their emblem on it.
Q. He was wearing that at the time
of the accident?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he ever wear this uniform when
he went out, when he was engaged in other
activities?
A. No.
Q. Can you tell us approximately what
time he left his home on the morning of the
accident?
A. I can't say definitely, but it would
have been between 5:30 and 6 :00." (Rl5R-16).

The above testimony is the entire testimony as
to what Mr. Bailey was doing the morning of the
accident. There was no room for speculation on the
part of the Industrial Commission, nor would it have
been proper for the Commission to have speculated
or to have guessed that the deceased man was doing
anything except traveling direct from his home to
his place of business at the time the accident
occurred.
In the case of Wherritt v. Industrial Commission, 110 P. 2d. 374, 100 Utah 68, the question
was whether Dr. Barton H. Wherritt was in the
course of his employement and was covered under
the Workmen's Compensation Act when his car
went over the embankment in City Creek Canyon
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at about 12 :00 midnight resulting in his death.
The Court, in rendering its opinion, had the following to say at 376 P. regarding the burden of proof:
"The burden of proof is upon Applicant
to establish her claim for compensation.
Hi,qley v. Industrial Commission, 75 U. 861,
285 P. 306; Bingham Mines Co. v. Allsop,
59 U. 306, 203 P. 644.
The fact finder is not always required
to believe the uncontradicted evidence of a
witness. Gagos v. Industrial Commission,
87 U. 101, 48 P. 2d. 440, nor is it bound to
adopt the theory of applicant for which there
may be supporting evidence or inference.
Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 U. 56, 75
P. 2d. 311.
The duties of this court are limited to a
determination of questions of law. We may
interfere with the commission's findings of
fact * * * where an a ward is denied against
uncontradicted evidence without any reasonable basis for disbelieving the same. In such
cases a question of law is presented for determination; otherwise, the findings of the commission must be affirmed: Russell v. Industrial Commission, 86 U. 306, 43 P. 2d. 1069,
1072."
The Court went on to say:
"Our duty is to examine the record and,
unless we can say that as a matter of law
the conclusion of the Commission on the question of "course of employment" was wrong
because only the opposite conclusion could
be drawn from these facts, to affirm."
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In General Mills, Inc. et al. v. Industrial Cmnmission, 120 P. 2d. 279, 101 U. 214 the Court in
citing another case stated that "mere surmise, conjecture, guess, or speculation" is insufficient. And
the Court further said, "Further, the burden is on
the complainant to prove that the injury is compensable." 120 P. 2d. at page 280.
The testimony relating to the fact that the
deceased was wearing an American Oil uniform at
the time the acciden't occurred appears to us to be
entirely immaterial. Most persons who are employed
wear the clothes required by their employment during the time that they travel to and from work. An
office worker wears a business suit while he is
traveling to and from his work and while he is
working. Other persons wear various types of clothing.
To further substantiate the fact that Mr. Bailey
was doing nothing other than traveling to his place
of employment is the fact that Mrs. Bailey indicated
that he left home between 5:30 and 6:00 in the morning (R-16). The accident happened prior to a quarter
to six as Fred Nakagawa, the operator of a garage
who was called to the scene of the accident by the
Highway Patrol Dispatcher, testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately
fifteen minutes to six on the morning of the accident. Therefore, there appears to be no possibility
for speculation that Mr. Bailey was doing anything
other than traveling directly from his home to his
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placP of employment at the time the accident
occurred.
POINT II.
THE DECISION CONSTITUTES "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" AND, IN EFFECT, EXTENDS THE COVERAGE AFFORDED SELFEMPLOYED PERSONS FAR BEYOND THE
COVERAGE AFFORDED TO THE EMPLOYED
vVORKMAN.
We submit that the decision rendered by this
Court should be again carefully reviewed because
of what we believe will be a very great extension
of the coverage afforded under the Workmen's Compensation Act to those who are self-employed over
and beyond the coverage afforded those who are
not self-employed. We feel that the decision rendered
herein as to self-employed persons, to all practical
effects abrogates and sets aside the general rule
that one coming to and going from his place of
employment in the absence of a special mission is
not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Court bases its decision upon the sole
point that the station wagon involved in the accident
was carried as a company asset and was used in
connection with the service station business. In
most businesses operated by a self-employed individual proprietor, an automobile is either wholly
or partially charged to the operation of the business.
This is true with lawyers, physicians, accountants,
and persons operating service establishments of all
kinds.
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If the doctrine stated in the decision is carried to its logical conclusion, then an individual
proprietor who is injured while driving an automobile which is either wholly or partially charged off
as a business asset would be afforded coverage each
day from the time he left his home until he arrived
back home at night after completing the day's
work. It often happens that doctors or lawyers are
called out at night. To afford coverage because of
the possibility that there might be a night call is
an unwarranted extension of the coverage. Such a
conclusion would afford the sole proprietor coverage far in excess of the coverage afforded to his
employees under the decisions of this Court.
This extension of coverage was certainly not
in the contemplation of the Legislature when the
act was amended in 1963 to permit sole proprietors
to take advantage of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The intent of the Legislature was to give to sole
proprietors, if they wished to pay the premium, the
same benefits afforded their employees.
The decision of the Court indicates that there
was some weight placed on the fact that the deceased
used the automobile for emergency calls at all
hours. The decision also states that he carried some
necessary tools and implements to service and repair
customers' automobiles. The only tool mentioned was
a starter cable which Mrs. Bailey testified she had
seen her husband carry in the vehicle. This cable was
not found at the scene of the accident although a
search was made. (R-41, 42). The automobile was
also used on occasion by customers when they left
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their automobile to be serviced. Certainly the same
conditions might be found to exist in connection with
a doctor's automobile, and even, in some cases, a
lawyer's automobile, both of whom, at times, are
called out on emergencies and both of whom will at
at times carry some of the necessary implements of
their professions in their automobiles. But these
facts alone should not insure a doctor or a lawyer
under the Workmen's Compensation Act from the
time he leaves his home unless he is then upon some
special mission. And then under the previous decisions of this Court the coverage is limited. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 8 P. 2d.
617, 79

u.

189.

The decision of the Court states that:
"There are cases in authority to the effect that, when an employee is required by his
employer to bring his own vehicle to the place
of business for use, the employee is covered
while going to and from work in the vehicle."
There should be a distinction made between
those cases in which an employer requires an employee to bring a vehicle to work and the instant
case. In the former case the employee could have
taken some other means of transportation to come
to or go from his place of employment. However,
in the instant case the deceased, of his own choosing, drove the vehicle involved in the accident back
and forth from his place of employment the same
as a lawyer, doctor, adjuster or any other type of
self-employed person would do.
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An enlightening case which discusses a fact
situation such as we have here in which the injured
man was driving his own vehicle and carrying business items is Philpott v. State Industrial Accident
Commission, 234 Ore. 37, 379 P. 2d. 1010 (1963).
The court in that case quoted the following from
Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, Sec.
18.24, page 251, as follows ( 1014 P. 2d.) :
"The mere fact that claimant is, while
going to work, also carrying with him some
of the paraphernalia of his employment does
not, in itself, convert the trip into a part of
the employment."
In the Philpott case the owner of a truck agreed
to haul logs to a lumber mill at the rate of $6.00
per thousand board feet. The owner paid all expense
incurred in the operation of the truck. He kept the
truck at his home, and used it to drive to the job
site. As he was about to leave for work one morning
he discovered that he had forgotten his lunch. He
was injured as he jumped from the truck.
It was argued that it benefited the em pioyer
for the plaintiff to drive his truck to and from
work, as it saved time. It was argued also that as
the truck was a necessary piece of equipment in
the work of hauling logs, and that the plaintiff
should be regarded as "rendering a service" to his
employer by "carrying employment impedimenta to
and from work." (279 2d. 1013).
The Orgeon court then quoted the statement
from Larsen's Compensation Law, Section 18.24 as
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above set forth; and held against the plaintiff. The
Court said:
"To allow the present claim would be to
sanction an unjustifiable departure from
controlling precedents."
Because of the very broad and serious extension
of the coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a very limited number of persons by
the decision rendered in this case it is important
and desirable that the Court again review the case
and its decision in the light of its past decisions and
the apparent legislative intent.
POINT III.
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT
IT FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE FINDING OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WHICH WAS
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT TESTIMONY
THAT THE ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTED
IN THE DEATH OF FRANK DEE BAILEY DID
NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
It has been established by numerous decisions
of this Court that it is the exclusive prerogative of
the Industrial Commission to appraise the evidence
and make findings of fact, which findings must not
not be disturbed if there is reasonable evidence to
support them.
This finding of the Commission in part reads :
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No evidence was presented by Applicant
to prove that deceased was in the course of
his employment as a self-insured owner and
operator of the business. In fact, the evidence
is undisputed and conclusive, in our opinion,
that the deceased was going to work when
he was fatally injured and not on a special
mission.
This finding was based upon the clear and
conclusive evidence presented in this case and the
decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this Court. See Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 U. 331, 57 P. 2d. 724.
The only states which have optional coverage
for partners and individual proprietorships are the
states of Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon and
Utah. As far as we have been able to learn there
have been no decisions rendered in any of the states
on the point involved in this case. We, therefore,
believe that our state should not extend the coverage
under the Workmen's Compensation Act beyond that
which has been previously accepted and defined by
this Court.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that on the law
and the facts, the decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
Attorney for Defendant,
Utah State Insurance Fund,
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Defendant's
Petition for Rehearing and Supporting Brief to
Heber Grant Ivins, Attorney for Applicant, 75
North Center Street, American Fork, Utah, and
to Phil L. Hansen, Attorney General, Attorney for
Defendant, Utah State Industrial Commission, Attorney General's Office, State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this ________ day of March, A.D.,
1965.

Charles Welch, Jr.
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